I. Statement of the Case:

This matter involves four unfair labor practice complaints ("Complaints") filed by the Fraternal Order of Police/Metropolitan Police Department Labor Committee ("FOP", "Union" or "Complainant") against the District of Columbia Office of Police Complaints ("OPC" or "Respondent"). The cases were consolidated by the Board’s Executive Director and referred to a Hearing Examiner. In these consolidated complaints, “Complainant asserts two categories of violations by Respondent: allegations that Respondent violated various provisions of the Labor Agreement and thereby repudiated it; and allegations that Respondents violated police officers’ Weingarten Rights.” (Footnote omitted) (Hearing Examiner’s Report and Recommendation at p. 5).\(^1\)

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\(^1\) See NLRB v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
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There were several hearing dates in this matter. In his Report and Recommendation ("R&R"), the Hearing Examiner determined that:

1. "[The] Complainant has not shown that Respondent repudiated a collective bargaining agreement";

2. "[The] Complainant has not shown that Respondent violated any employee's Weingarten rights";

3. "The four unfair labor practice complaints should be dismissed in their entirety, with prejudice"; and

4. "The parties' respective motions for award of costs should be denied."

(R&R at p. 2).

The Complainant and Respondent filed exceptions to the Hearing Examiner's R&R ("Complainant's Exceptions" and "Respondent's Exceptions"). The Complainant filed an opposition to the Respondent's Exceptions ("Complainant's Opposition"). The Hearing Examiner's R&R, the Complaint's and Respondent's Exceptions and the Complainant's Response are before the Board for disposition.

II. Hearing Examiner's Report and Recommendation

The Hearing Examiner found that the four complaints were based upon the following facts:

Complainant represents certain employees in the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), primarily police officers through the rank of sergeant (See PERB Certification No. 10, February 18, 1982; PERB Case No. 81-R-05). At the time of the incidents giving rise to these consolidated unfair labor practice complaints, there existed a "Labor Agreement between the Government of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department and the Fraternal Order of Police MPD Labor Committee", effective FY2004-FY2008 (Labor Agreement).

Respondent, the Office of Police Complaints (OPC), is a District agency established by D.C. Law 12-208 (March 26, 1999) (codified at DCC §§ 5-1101 et seq.). The purpose of this law is "to establish an effective, efficient, and fair system of independent review of citizen complaints against police officers in the District of Columbia" (DCC §5-1102). A five member Police Complaints Board,

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2 The Hearing was held on: November 13 and 14, 2007; December 18, 2007; January 22 and 23, 2008; and April 10, 2008.
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one of whom is a member of the MPD and four persons who have no current
affiliation with a law enforcement agency, are appointed by the Mayor, subject to
confirmation by the Council, for staggered three year terms. The Mayor
designates the chairperson, and may remove a member for cause (DC §5-1104).

(R&R at p. 2) (Footnote omitted).

The Hearing Examiner indicated that he reviewed the investigatory procedures of OPC as
authorized under D.C. Code § 5-1106 to D.C. Code § 5-1114. “Of particular relevance to the to
these unfair labor practice complaints are the procedures used by OPC investigators when
interviewing police officers in connection with citizen complaints.” (R&R at p. 3). Specifically,
the Hearing Examiner noted that a police officer who is the subject of the citizen complaint
under investigation is entitled to representation. The Respondent’s Investigation Manual,
300.18(b)(1) Personal representative, states:

Under the MPD FOP Labor Agreement (See Appendix K3), the subject officer is
authorized to have a representative present during the interview. This
representative may be an attorney, or, as in most cases, a union representative
from the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP). The interview may be delayed up to
two hours to allow the subject officer to obtain the assistance of a union
representative. (CX6 Bates Nos. 944-945).

(R&R at p. 4).

Furthermore, the Hearing Examiner noted that pursuant to the Manual, 300.18(c)(1):

While the witness officer is not entitled to the presence of an attorney or other
union representative, the investigator will allow a representative to be present
during the interview. However, the two hour delay does not apply in this
instance. (CX6 at Bates No. 945).

(R&R at p. 4).

The Hearing Examiner also stated that appended to the Investigation Manual is a Garrity
Notice3, which:

advises the officer being questioned that he is “entitled to all the rights and
privileges guaranteed by the laws of the District of Columbia and the Constitution
of the United States, and the union contract between the Fraternal Order of Police
and the District of Columbia, including the right not to be compelled to
incriminate [him]self” (CX77; replaces CX6 at Bates No. 949).”

3 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1966), holding that an employee may be compelled to give statements under
threat of discipline or discharge, but such statements cannot be used in a criminal prosecution of the individual.
The Hearing Examiner found that the unfair labor practice complaints in this matter allege:

that Respondent violated various provisions of the Labor Agreement and thereby repudiated it; and [allege that the] Respondent violated police officers' *Weingarten* rights. The provisions of the Labor Agreement at issue are located in Article 13, Investigatory Questioning, which states in pertinent part:

Section 1
The efficiency of the service of the Department, including internal security practices and the obligation of members to respond to questioning shall be governed by existing Departmental policies and procedures unless abridged by this Agreement.

Section 2
Types of questioning:
(a) **Administrative Interview** – Formal official questioning conducted by the Department to question an employee about an administrative matter.

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Section 3
Where (1) an employee can reasonably expect discipline to result from an investigatory interview, or (2) the employee is the target of an administrative investigation conducted by the Employer, at the request of the employee, questioning shall be delayed for no longer than two (2) hours in order to give the employee an opportunity to consult with a Union representative. The two-hour limit will be strictly adhered to unless management agrees that the issue is sufficiently complex and therefore requires additional time for preparation. Where management agrees that additional time should be granted such additional time will not exceed four (4) hours. The Department shall not intentionally mislead a member or Union representative as to the purpose of the questioning.

(a) A member's Union representative may be present at all administrative interview sessions under this Article, but may not answer questions on behalf of the employee. The Department reserves the right to refuse a particular Union representative for good cause, and the member to be interviewed shall then name an alternative representative.
Section 4

1. Prior to the commencement of any interview or interrogation, members shall be informed of the type of investigation being conducted (criminal or administrative).

2. Prior to the commencement of any administrative interview, criminal interview or interrogation, a member shall be informed of:
   a) Whether the member is a target of the investigation, if known at the time.
   b) The name of the Departmental official conducting the interview.
   c) The names of the persons present.
   d) Management’s failure to abide by the procedures listed in paragraphs a-f will not be a bar to the processing of a case or the imposition of corrective or adverse action, including termination. This does not preclude the Union from including such failure in the defense of a member.

(R&R at pgs. 5-7).

The Hearing Examiner’s factual determinations regarding the Newbold/Hemphill Incident.

The Hearing Examiner found that “[o]n November 14, 2005, Officer Jeffrey Newbold was at Respondent’s offices, serving as representative for Officer Patrick Hemphill, who was being interviewed by OPC in connection with a citizen complaint. According to Newbold’s testimony, Hemphill was not the target of the OPC investigation.” (R&R at p. 8) (Footnote omitted). During the investigation, a disagreement arose between Officer Newbold and the OPC investigators Day and Rowan. Specifically, after Day finished questioning Hemphill, Rowan began asking questions. Officer Newbold asserted that only one investigator may ask the officer questions. (See R&R at p. 8). Officer Newbold told Officer Hemphill not to answer additional questions posed by Rowan. (See R&R at p. 8). After Hemphill indicated he preferred to be questioned by only one investigator, Day ordered Officer Newbold to leave the interview. (See R&R at p. 8). Officer Newbold refused, indicating he would not leave until he was “sure Hemphill understood his rights.” (R&R at p. 8). Ultimately, Officer Newbold was informed that “he was being relieved of his duties as union representative because he had disrupted the
interview, and would be barred from representing FOP/MPDDLC members in the future. Hemphill agreed to questioning without union representation.” (R&R at p. 8).

The Hearing Examiner's factual determinations regarding the Carter/Cunningham Incident.

The Hearing Examiner found that “[on] January 30, 2006, Officer Richard Carter, represented by Officer Wendell Cunningham, was being interviewed by OPC Investigators Kevin Smith and Alan Peyrouton.” (R&R at p. 9) (Footnote omitted). The Hearing Examiner also found that Carter was, according to Respondent, the target of the investigation. (See R&R at p. 9). During the interview Officer Cunningham objected to the relevance of a question concerning whether Officer Carter had prior police experience and had a disagreement with both investigators as well as Chief investigator Stoddard. (See R&R at p. 9). When Cunningham and Carter objected to Chief Stoddard asking whether Carter had prior police experience, Chief Stoddard removed Cunningham and informed Carter he could get another representative. (See R&R at p. 9).

The Hearing Examiner's factual determinations regarding the Carter/Rosario Incident.

The Hearing Examiner reviewed the alleged facts concerning the events which occurred after Officer Cunningham was removed from the interview. The Hearing Examiner made the following determination:

Officer Hiram Rosario was called to represent Carter. As it was his first time at OPC’s new offices, Rosario asked about the glass on the wall of the interview room, apparently a two-way mirror. He testified that he did not get a satisfactory answer to his question about who might be behind the two-way mirror. He also asked about a device in the ceiling, and was told by Investigator Peyrouton that it was a smoke detector. Rosario believed that it was more likely a microphone or camera. He wrote a memorandum to FOP/MPDDLC Chairman Bauman on February 21, 2006, summarizing the incident.

Rosario was back at OPC’s offices on February 7, 2006, to represent another officer (neither the officer’s name nor whether he was a target or a witness is in the record). He asked again about the device in the ceiling and was told by an OPC investigator that it was a microphone. He referred to his previous visit, when he was told it was a smoke detector. At this point, Chief Investigator Stoddard entered the interview room. Rosario said he assumed Stoddard had been watching and listening to the activity in the interview room through the two-way mirror. Stoddard confirmed that the device in the ceiling was a microphone. Rosario told Stoddard that if the interview was being recorded the member was entitled to a copy of the tape, and that if the member was not told about the existence of such a tape that it would probably violate District and Federal law.
Stoddard told Rosario he was no longer welcome to represent FOP/MPDLC members.

(R&R at pgs 9-10) (Footnote omitted).

Based upon these incidents, the Hearing Examiner summarized the unfair labor practice complaints as follows:

March 14, 2006 (PERB Case No. 06-U-24): Complainant presented factual allegations with respect to the November 14, 2005 incident, and charge that Respondent had committed unfair labor practices by insisting on using more than one investigator to ask questions of the officer being interviewed over the objections of union representative Newbold, and by removing Newbold from the interview, in violation of Weingarten.

(R&R at p. 10) (Citations omitted).

March 21, 2006 (PERB Case No. 06-U-25): Complainant referred back to OPC Executive Director Eure's 2004 letter stating that the Labor Agreement may not apply to OPC, stated that no one from Deputy Mayor Kellem's office had ever responded to the question of whether the Labor Agreement applied to OPC, and claimed that Eure had stated on March 16, 2006, that the Labor Agreement did not apply. Complainant presented an affidavit from Officer Rosario that Eure had made the latter remarks; Respondent did not address this claim in its answer. Based on these factual allegations, Complainant charged that Respondent had repudiated the Labor Agreement by insisting that police officers sign paraphrased written statement, by refusing to identify persons behind the two-way mirror, and by asking questions outside the scope of the citizen complaint under investigation.

(R&R at p. 10) (Citations and footnote omitted).

March 23, 2006 (PERB Case No. 06-U-26): Complainant presented factual allegations with respect to the events of January 30, 2006, and February 7, 2006. Complainant charged that Respondent had repudiated the Labor Agreement by failing to identify persons present for the interviews, asking questions beyond the scope of the complaint under investigation, and intentionally misrepresenting whether an interview was being recorded.

(R&R at p. 10).

March 24, 2006 (PERB Case No. 06-U-27): Complainant presented factual allegations with respect to an incident that occurred on January 19, 2006. PERB’s Executive Director dismissed the complaint administratively on May 18, 2006, for failure to state a basis for a claim under the [Comprehensive Personnel Merit Act, D.C. Code § 1-6. (“CMPA”)]: “Your allegation concerning OPC’s failure to
comply with Article 13 of the parties’ CBA, presents an issue of contract interpretation. ... [A]ny allegation concerning a party’s failure to comply with the terms of the parties’ CBA, presents an issue that is not statutorily based, but one of contract interpretation. Furthermore, the Board has noted that “[u]nder the CMPA, a breach of contract does not constitute a per se statutory violation.””

(R&R at pgs. 10-11) (Citations and footnote omitted).

March 24, 2006 (PERB Case No. 067-U-28): Complainant presented factual allegations with respect to the incident of January 30, 2006. Complainant charged that Respondent had committed unfair labor practices by repudiating the Labor Agreement and improperly removing union representative Cunningham from the interview.

(R&R at p. 11) (Citations omitted).

After considering the issues presented by the parties, the Hearing Examiner determined the issues to be:

“(1) Did Respondent, by its statements and actions, repudiate the Labor Agreement? If so, what is the appropriate remedy?” and

(2) “Did Respondent, on November 14, 2005, January 30, 2006, and/or February 7, 2006, violate the Weingarten rights of MPD police officers represented by Complainant? If so, what is an appropriate remedy?”

(R&R at p. 12).

The Hearing Examiner considered the arguments presented by the parties. In his R&R, he summarized the Complainant’s position:

PERB has jurisdiction to determine whether an agency can be found to be a party to a collective bargaining agreement even if it did not sign that agreement. Complainant pointed to PERB’s decision in American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. District of Columbia Government, Case no. 97-U-15A, Opin No. 590 (1999), in which PERB found that the office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) was bound by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement originally negotiated between a bargaining unit represented by AFSCME within the Office of Controller that was later transferred to the OCFO.

(R&R at p. 13).

In addition, the Complainant contended that “members of the bargaining unit represented by Complainant are protected by the Weingarten right that PERB has found to be implied in the
When they are subject to interviews conducted by Respondent. Furthermore, Complainant noted, police officers interviewed by Respondent have a reasonable belief that the questioning may lead to discipline, either for the underlying incident being investigated or for alleged failure to cooperate with the investigation.” (R&R at p. 13). “[W]hen Respondent threatens discipline against police officers, it is invoking the authority of the District and MPD, not its own authority, and thus creates a Weingarten situation.” (R&R at p. 13). The Complainant also claimed that “Respondent and Complainant had a mutually agreeable past practice of permitting union representation of all interviews conducted by Respondent. Complainant noted that in PERB Case No. 97-U-15A, PERB held that Weingarten rights can be extended by mutually agreeable past practice.” (R&R at p. 13).

The Complainant addressed the factual allegations raised in the complaints such as the Respondent’s alleged infringements on police officers’ Weingarten rights by expelling union representatives and using disguised listening devices. (See R&R at pgs. 13-14). In addition, FOP “points to case law that recognizes not only the right of a union representative to be present at investigative interviews, but allows that representative to participate in the interview. (N.L.R.B. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 730 F.2d. 166, 172 (5th Cir., 1984), such as by requesting clarification of questions (N.L.R.B. v Texaco, Inc., 659 F.2d 124, 126-127 (9th Cir. 1981); N.L.R.B. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 612, 613 (1980)). In Complainant’s view, Respondent violated police officer’s Weingarten rights by refusing to allow union representatives to take an active role during investigative interviews.” (R&R at p. 14).

Furthermore, Complainant asserted that “the terms of the Labor Agreement establish that Respondent is bound by its terms: it was signed by MPD representatives “FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT”, and ratified by the Mayor on behalf of the District. “Like all contracts, therefore, the CBA binds the District and all of its agents and representatives acting on the District’s behalf.” (C/PHB at 19).” (R&R at p. 14). The Complainant also pointed to PERB precedent which it claims “makes clear that non-signatory District agencies are bound by collective bargaining agreement entered into by other District agencies. Complainant points to the decision in American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Office of the Controller, PERB Case No. 96-U-01, Opin. No. 503 (1996), where PERB held that the Office of the Chief Financial Officer was bound by collective bargaining agreements between employees and other district agencies prior to transfer of those employees to the newly-created OCFO.” (R&R at p. 16).

The Hearing Examiner summarized the Complainant’s argument and request for remedies as follows:

Because Respondent’s purpose is to investigate claims of police misconduct, Complainant states, it makes logical sense that the investigatory guidelines found in Article 13 of the Labor Agreement are the only portions of the Labor Agreement that apply to Respondent. Complainant notes that PERB has held that a party’s refusal to implement a viable collective bargaining agreement is an unfair labor practice, and argues that Respondent’s explicit statements that the
Labor Agreement did not apply to its investigations, its insistence on allowing two of its investigators to ask questions during interviews of police officers notwithstanding the one-questioner provision of Article 13, the use of a two-way mirror during interviews, asking questions outside the scope of the citizen complaint being investigated, and requiring police officers to sign written statements prepared by Respondent’s investigators, all constitute express repudiation of the Labor Agreement.

As remedies, Complainant requests the following:

- A finding that police officers represented by Complainant are entitled to Weingarten rights during administrative interviews conducted by Respondent;

- A finding that the Labor Agreement applies to Respondent, and that officers represented by Complainant are entitled to their rights under Article 13 during interviews conducted by Respondent;

- A finding that Respondent committed unfair labor practices in violation of DCC §1-617.04(a)(1) and (5);

- An order that Respondent cease and desist from interfering with, restraining, or coercing police officers represented by Complainant in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by the Labor Agreement and by the CMPA;

- An order that Respondent cease and desist from refusing to inform police officers of the names of persons present at administrative interviews, including those present behind two-way mirrors;

- An order that Respondent cease and desist from requiring that police officers sign under oath paraphrased statements prepared by Respondent’s investigators;

- An order that Respondent cease and desist from requiring police officers to answer questions by its investigators that are beyond the scope of the citizen complaint being investigated;

- An order that Respondent conspicuously post no fewer than two notices of their violations and PERB’s Order in each of Respondent’s buildings and each MPD building;
An order directing Respondent to pay Claimant’s costs and fees associated with these unfair labor practice proceedings; and

- Any other relief deemed appropriate.

(R&R at pgs. 17-18).

At the hearing, the Respondent argued "that PERB lacks jurisdiction to determine whether a party has agreed to be bound by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. [D.C. Code] §1-605.02 gives PERB a number of explicit authorities . . ., but no provision of the CMPA gives it the authority to determine such matters as contract formation, contract interpretation, or breach of contract." (R&R at p. 18). In addition, the Respondent contends that "[a]djudication of the several unfair labor practice complaints at issue here . . . would necessarily involve interpretation of Respondent’s administrative practices and the nature of procedural protections afforded to police officers. PERB, Respondent argues, lacks the authority to make such interpretations." (R&R at p. 19). The Respondent also argued that it is not a party bound by the Labor Agreement, and therefore cannot be deemed to have repudiated it. There is, Respondent asserts, no credible evidence that Respondent had a bargaining relationship with Complainant, or had otherwise agreed to be bound by the terms of the Labor Agreement. (R&R at p. 19).

The Respondent also asserted that:

no operation of law can support a finding that OPC is bound by the terms of the Labor Agreement. It points to case law of the NLRB examining the question of whether separate business entities constitute a single employer: interrelation of operations, common management, centralized control of labor relations, and common ownership or financial control (Hydrolines, Inc. et al. and Local 333, United Marine Division, International Longshoremen’s Association, 305 N.L.R.B. 416, 417 (1991). While NLRB does not consider any one factor to be controlling, and not all factors need be present, it does regard the first three factors, particularly the issue of centralization of labor relations, to be most significant. Under these principles, Respondent argues, it cannot be held that OPC and the MPD are a single employer: there is no interrelation of operations or management between the two entities, and they operate under different statutes to achieve different purposes. OPC’s primary role, in fact, is to provide independent review of police activities in order to reduce community tensions (DCC §5-1101).

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The Hearing Examiner noted that the Respondent cited PERB cases Green v. D. C. Department of Corrections, Case No. 89-U-10, Opin. No. 257 (1990), and American Federation of Government Employees, Local 2725 v. District of Columbia Housing Authority, Case No. 96-U-19, Opin. No. 488 (1999), in support of this position.
Further, OPC does not report to the MPD. The presence of a single MPD representative on the Police Complaints Board that oversees OPC is insufficient to establish that there is an interrelation of operations between MPD and OPC. Most importantly, there is no interrelation of personnel functions.

(R&R at pgs 20-21).

The Hearing Examiner also noted that Respondent’s position, as argued at the hearing, made allegations that:

PERB precedent erroneously holds that the CMPA affords Weingarten rights to employees. In three decisions in which it summarily concluded that the CMPA provides the right to union representation in certain investigative interviews (starting with Green v. D. C. Department of Corrections, Case No. 89-U-10, Opin. No. 257 (1990)), PERB did not identify the particular statutory provision of the CMPA that implied this right. Respondent notes that the Supreme Court’s decision upholding the NLRB’s finding that such a right was implicit in the National Labor Relations Act was based on the language of §7 that employees have the right to engage in concerted activity for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. The phrase “mutual aid or protection”, Respondent notes, is not found in the enumerated rights of employees under DCC §1-617.06 or of labor organizations under DCC §1-617-11, or anywhere else in the CMPA. “PERB, therefore, should review and reverse its position that Weingarten rights are supported by the CMPA.”

(R&R at p. 21).

Furthermore, the Respondent argued that the Complainant had “failed to establish that subject officers’ Weingarten rights were violated during OPC investigative interviews . . . . and that Weingarten does not address or govern such matters as the recording of interviews, the individuals present at the interviews, or the scope of the questions that may be asked (Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251).” (R&R at p. 22). The Respondent also noted that the Complainant did not argue that its members were denied representation during interviews, but that the investigatory interviews were not conducted consistent with the procedures of Article 13 of the Labor Agreement. Citing Board case law, the Respondent asserted that “[s]uch allegations do not rise to the level of unfair labor practices; they are mere allegations of contract violations (Fraternal Order of Police v. D. C. Metropolitan Police Department, PERB Case No. 94-U-23, Opin. No. 384 (1999)).” (R&R at p. 22).
The Hearing Examiner’s Analysis and Recommendations

The Hearing Examiner determined that the consolidated complaints and the Respondent’s opposition presented three issues:

Did Respondent, by its statements and actions, repudiate the Labor Agreement? If so, what is an appropriate remedy?

The Hearing Examiner found the threshold question posed by the parties to be: “Who are the parties to the Labor Agreement?” (R&R at p. 25). Further, the Hearing Examiner, having determined that the parties to the Labor agreement are the District of Columbia and the FOP/MPDLC, observed that the appropriate question is “not who the parties to this collective bargaining agreement are, but what those parties have committed themselves to.” (R&R at p. 26). The Hearing Examiner rejected the Complainant’s reliance on AFSCME v. District of Columbia Gov’t, 97-U-15A in support of its contention that the OPC could be bound to the terms of the Labor Agreement. (See R&R at p. 26). The Hearing Examiner found that in that case, “[the Board] . . . did not make a determination that an agency other than the one that originally signed the collective bargaining agreement was party to it. . . . [Instead, the Board] found simply that an existing collective bargaining relationship survived the transfer of the employees in an existing bargaining unit from one personnel authority to another.” (R&R at p. 26). In the present case, the Hearing Examiner found that there had been no transfer of either employees or personnel authority. The employees represented by Complainant were, at the time the Labor Agreement was negotiated, as well as at the time the incidents giving rise to these unfair labor practice complaints took place, in a bargaining unit within the MPD. The bargaining unit is not now, and has never been, within OPC, and there is certainly no showing that Respondent is a “personnel authority” with respect to the employees represented by Complainant.” (R&R at p. 26).

Moreover, the Hearing Examiner concluded that “[t]he question of whether Respondent had an obligation, one that it allegedly repudiated, to abide by the terms of the Labor Agreement is not answered by finding that Respondent is a party to the Labor Agreement, but by examining the commitments made by the parties to the Labor Agreement, commitments that are determined by reading the text of the agreement itself. That agreement must, in turn, be read in accordance with applicable law. Reading and interpreting the Labor Agreement, however, is not a matter that is within PERB’s jurisdiction.” (R&R at p. 27). The Hearing Examiner stated that the Board: (1) “has long held that disputes concerning contract interpretation, including allegations that the contract has been violated, should be settled through the grievance procedure.” 5; and (2)

5 In support of this finding the Hearing Examiner cited American Federation of Government Employees and the District of Columbia Department of Corrections, 48 DCR 6549, Slip Op. No. 59 at p. 4, PERB Case No. 83-U-03,
the Board “has found that it does not have authority to interpret a collective bargaining agreement to determine the merits of a cause of action, such as an allegation of failure to bargain in good faith, that may otherwise properly be within [the Board’s] jurisdiction.” (R&R at pgs. 27-28).6 In this case, the Hearing Examiner concluded that the allegations raised in the unfair labor practice complaints require an interpretation of the CBA, specifically Article 13 of the CBA, and “should be answered in the first instance through the grievance and arbitration procedure of the Labor Agreement.” (R&R at p. 29). Consequently, the Hearing Examiner found that the Complainant has not shown that the Respondent committed an unfair labor practice by repudiating the Labor Agreement.” (R&R at p. 29).

Did Respondent violate Weingarten rights of Complainant’s members?

The Hearing Examiner found that, for purposes of the CMPA, the Board has “clearly [held] that the Weingarten right exists.”7 Next, the Hearing Examiner determined whether there “[c]an be a Weingarten right when an employee of one District agency is interviewed by officials or representatives of another District agency?” (R&R at p. 29). The Hearing Examiner found that:

[t]he labor-management relations provisions of the CMPA make it an unfair labor practice for “[t]he District, its agents, and representatives” to interfere with, restrain, or coerce “any employee in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by this subchapter” (DCC §1-617.04(a)(1). The basic Weingarten right is a statutory right, not a contractual right, and Respondent, as an agent or representative of the District, must honor it. The question of the applicability of more expansive, related rights, such as those contained in Article 13, Section 3, of the Labor Agreement, is a separate one, and is not implicated in these unfair labor practice complaints. (R&R at p. 31).

The Hearing Examiner concluded that the interviews of the police officers which are the subject of the unfair labor practice complaints conducted by OPC “are clearly investigatory interviews within the meaning of the Weingarten right. In those situations in which the officer being interviewed has been told that he is the subject of the investigation, his belief that the

(1983): “disputes concerning contract interpretation and alleged contract violations should be properly resolved through negotiated grievance procedures.”


7 In Weingarten, the United States Supreme Court held that Sections 7 and 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. Sections 157 and 158(a)(1), guarantee and protect the right of an employee to the presence of “a union representative at an investigatory interview in which the risk of discipline reasonably inheres . . . .”
interview may lead to discipline is entirely reasonable, and he is entitled to union representation if he requests it. However, when a police officer is called to an interview by OPC as a witness to a citizen complaint, he has no reason to expect to be disciplined in connection with that complaint. Of course, if at some point the officer were to become a target, he would have to be so advised by OPC and he could then invoke his Weingarten right to representation. I find no merit in the suggestion that because a witness officer may be disciplined for failing to cooperate with the OPC investigation he is in all cases entitled to Weingarten rights. Any discipline that results from such failure to cooperate is because of that failure, not because of any information gathered through the interview." (R&R at p. 32). In view of the above, the Hearing Examiner determined that in PERB Case Nos. 06-U-24 and 06-U-26, the police officers, although afforded union representation, had no right to union representation under Weingarten. (See R&R at p. 32). Whereas, the officer in PERB Case No. 06-U-28 was the target of an investigation, but was provided representation, there was no Weingarten violation. (See R&R at p. 32).

The next question considered by the Hearing Examiner was whether “the removal of union representatives from interviews conducted by OPC violate Weingarten?” (R&R at p. 32). In the case of the incident of January 30, 2006, the Hearing Examiner found that Officer "Cunningham acted outside the bounds of permissible behavior for a union representative when he attempted to prevent OPC investigators from asking questions of Officer Carter that, in his judgment, were outside the scope of the citizen complaint at issue." The Hearing Examiner noted that the objections posed by Officer Cunningham were contractual and that “the proper forum for a grievance confrontation. Any arguments that a question is beyond the scope of the complaint being investigated gets to the protocols and procedures of OPC under its governing statute, and PERB has no jurisdiction to entertain them. OPC did not violate Weingarten when it excluded Cunningham from the interview.” (R&R at pgs. 33-34).

Furthermore, the Hearing Examiner determined that since the officers being interviewed in the incidents on November 14, 2005, or February 7, 2006, were not the targets of OPC investigations, they had no right under Weingarten to union representation. (See R&R at p. 34). Specifically, the Hearing Examiner notes that:

[a]ccordingly, OPC’s ejection of the union representatives on those dates did not violate Weingarten. Even if, for the sake of argument, the officers being interviewed on those dates were entitled to union representation, the ejection of the union representatives was permissible under Weingarten for reasons similar to those that justified the ejection of Cunningham on November 14, 2005. The fact that they may not have actually raised their voices or become particularly combative does not mitigate a finding that their attempt to prevent questioning of the officers they represented was disruptive to the legitimate process of the investigatory interview. (R&R at p. 34).
Motions for Costs

The last issue addressed in the Report and Recommendation concerned a request by: (1) Complainant for reimbursement of costs incurred in responding to a motion to dismiss filed by Respondent; and (2) Respondent for reimbursement of costs incurred in responding to a motion to compel discovery filed by Complainant. (See R&R at p. 34). The Hearing Examiner examined the parties’ requests in light of Board precedent. Specifically, the Hearing Examiner took notice of the Board’s decision in AFSCME, District Council 20, Local 2776, AFL-CIO v. D. C. Department of Finance and Revenue, 36 DCR 5658, Slip Op. No. 245 at p. 5, PERB Case No. 89-U-02 (1989).

In order for an award of costs to be justified, PERB stated, several criteria must be met. The party to whom the payment is to be made must have been successful in at least a significant part of the case, and the requested costs must be reasonable. “Last, and this of course is the nub of the matter, we believe such an award must be shown to be in the interest of justice.”

Just what characteristics of a case will warrant the finding that an award of costs will be in the interest of justice cannot be exhaustively catalogued. We do not believe it possible to elaborate in any one case a complete set of rules or earmarks to govern all cases, nor would it be wise to rule out such awards in circumstances that we cannot now foresee. What we can say here is that among the situations in which such an award is appropriate are those in which the losing party’s claim or position was wholly without merit, those in which the successfully challenged action was undertaken in bad faith, and those in which a reasonably foreseeable result of the successfully challenged conduct is the undermining of the union among the employees for whom it is the exclusive bargaining representative.

PERB has considered requests for costs in numerous cases, but always, as best I can determine, in connection with an entire case, not in connection with individual motions presented in the course of a particular case. While I do not believe a blanket rule precluding the award of costs in connection with the outcome of motions, rather than the outcome of the underlying case (usually

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8 Under D.C. Code §1-617.13(d), the Board has “the authority to require the payment of reasonable costs incurred by a party to a dispute from the other party or parties as the Board may determine.”
unfair labor practice complaints) would be a good idea, I do not find that the interest of justice would be served by an award of fees to either party here.

(R&R at pgs 37-38) (Emphasis added and citations omitted).

Therefore, the Hearing Examiner recommended that both of the parties' requests for costs be denied.

At the conclusion of his analysis and discussion, the Hearing Examiner made the following findings and recommendations:

1) Complainant has not shown that Respondent repudiated a collective bargaining agreement.
2) Complainant has not shown that Respondent violated any employee's Weingarten rights.
3) The four unfair labor practice complaints should be dismissed in their entirety, with prejudice. [And]
4) The parties' respective motions for award of costs should be denied.

(R&R at p. 40).

VII. Complainant's Exceptions

The Complainant's exceptions present a mixture of disputes with the Hearing Examiner's factual findings and his discussion of the arguments presented at the hearing and in its post-hearing brief. The Complainant claims that the Hearing Examiner's R&R "wrongly concludes that OPC did not commit unfair labor practices, and the Report misconstrues and misapplies the CMPA and Board precedent. The Complainant states that the R&R is in error by ignoring the testimonial and documentary evidence presented at the hearings and conclusively established that the CBA applies to OPC and that OPC committed multiple unfair labor practices by repudiating the CBA and mutually agreeable past practices and violating FOP Members' Weingarten rights." (Complainant's Exceptions at p. 2). FOP asserts that it has seven specific exceptions to the Report, and makes the following factual and legal conclusions:

(1) The CBA applies to OPC;
(2) OPC Committed an unfair labor practice by expressly repudiating the CBA;
(3) FOP and OPC had established mutually agreed past practices;
(4) OPC committed unfair labor practices by expressly repudiating the FOP/OPC mutually agreed past practice;

(5) FOP Members are entitled to Weingarten rights during all OPC investigatory interviews in which they are questioned (not just when designated as targets);

(6) OPC violated Weingarten by ejecting FOP Shop Stewards who properly invoked Members’ rights under the CBA and/or mutually agreed past practices; and

(7) FOP is entitled to costs incurred in responding to OPC’s frivolous Motion to Dismiss.

(Complainant’s Exceptions at p. 2).

First, the Complainant requests that the Board reconsider testimonial evidence presented at the hearings. (See Complainant’s Exceptions at pgs. 3-23). Specifically, the Complainant argues that the Hearing Examiner erroneously failed to reach the conclusion that the CBA applies to OPC as a representative of the District of Columbia. (See Complainant’s Exceptions at p. 23). In support of this argument, the Complainant asserts that “the Report’s recommendation to grieve the CBA’s application to OPC ignores evidence presented during the hearing.” (Complainant’s Exceptions at p. 23).

In addition, the Complainant reasserts its argument that the Board’s holdings in American Federation of State County and Municipal Employee, District Council 20, Local 1200 v. District of Columbia, Office of the Controller, Division of Financial Management, 46 DCR 41, Slip Op. 503, PERB Case 96-UC-01 (1996) and District Council 20, American Federation of State County and Municipal Employee, District Council 20, Local 1200, 2776, 2401 and 2087 v. District of Columbia, et al., 46 DCR 6513, Slip Op. No. 590, PERB Case No. 97-U-15A (1999), support its contention that a collective bargaining agreement can be binding on a non-signatory to the agreement. (See Complainant’s Exceptions at p. 24 and pgs 41-43).

The Complainant also contends that the Hearing Examiner’s R&R “failed to acknowledge that the CBA expressly references OPC as follows:

The employer shall provide up to forty hours of official time each week for one Bargaining Unit member as permanently designated by the Chairman, to receive, investigate, prepare for and represent members in any meetings, conferences, or similar event of a member required to appear before or on behalf of the Office of Police Complaints.

CBA Art. 9, § 8, ¶ 4.” (Complainant’s Exceptions at pgs. 24-25).
In addition, the Complainant's Exceptions assert that the Hearing Examiner “fail[ed] to analyze (and fails in many cases to even mention) key witness testimony and documentary evidence demonstrating that the CBA applies to OPC.” (Complainant’s Exceptions at p. 27). Further objections to the Hearing Examiner’s findings state that that the R&R “ignores overwhelming evidence of the mutually agreeable past practice that OPC abide by the CBA.” (Complainant’s Exceptions at p. 35).

The Complainant also maintains that an analogy can be drawn from the NLRB’s cases concerning “double-breasting” as a basis for the application of the CBA to OPC. (See Complainant’s Exceptions at pgs. 44-46). "Double breasting" is a term that has been utilized by the NLRB, and means that one employer acts as the alter ego of another employer. No contention is made that the Hearing Examiner erred in consideration of this argument. Instead, the Complainant reasserts the argument made to the Hearing Examiner that the relationship between OPC and MPD is analogous to a “double-breasted operation” which can occur “when owners of one company that is a party to a labor agreement, own a second company that is non-union.” (Complainant’s Exceptions at p. 44, citing *A. Darlano & Sons, Inc. v. District Council of Painters No. 33*, 869 F. 2d 514, 517 (1989)). A similar relationship, the Complainant contends, exists between MPD and OPC and binds OPC to the CBA between MPD and the Complainant. (See Complainant’s Exceptions pgs. 44-46).

The Complainant makes an exception to the Hearing Examiner’s R&R alleging that the findings at page 27 of the R&R “presents a slippery slope argument that the Board cannot interpret the CBA to determine what applies to OPC and whether OPC has committed an unfair labor practice.” (Complainant’s Exceptions at p. 46, footnote omitted). The Report and Recommendation states:

> It is clear that the principal aspects of the Labor Agreement that are of interest to Complainant are those that involve interviews of

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9 Complainant sites for support and example, *A. Darlano & Sons, Inc. v. District Council of Painters No. 33*, 869 F. 2d 514 (1989); *Carpenters Local Union No. 1478 v. Stevens*, 743 F. 2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1984) (unions have used unfair labor complaints to address the issue of double-breasting and when labor agreements should extend to the non-union side of a business with union and non-union entities. The case was a review of an arbitration award that conflicted with the NLRB’s findings that the companies were not alter egos or joint companies. The parties in the case were a concrete construction company and a local union); *UA Local 343 v. Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc*, 48 F. 3d 1465 (1995) (the cases lists the factors considered as a part of the single employer test. Case involved a plumbing company and local union alleging that owner breached collective bargaining agreement based on theory that an agreement between union and union firm covered nonunion firm because it was an alter ego of the union firm.); and *South Prairie Construction Company v. Local 627, International Union of Operating Engineers*, 425 U.S. 800 (1976). Complainant alleges that analogous National Labor Relations Board cases should lead PERB to employ the single employer test, developed by the NLRB to the instant case.
officers in connection with investigations into citizen complaints. However, the logic of Complainant’s reasoning is not limited to this aspect of the Labor Agreement. To take a trivial example: Article 11, Section 2, of the Labor Agreement provides that “The Department agrees to furnish suitable space on Departmental bulletin boards for display of Union materials.” Under Complainant’s understanding of the fact that it is the District of Columbia that is party to the Labor Agreement (as the employer), all obligations of the employer fall on all representatives of the employer, including OPC. By this logic, OPC is obliged to provide bulletin board space to the FOP/MPDLC (and, in fact, so would the Department of Finance and Revenue, as well as all other District agencies). While there appears to be no theoretical reason the Mayor could not provide such an arrangement in the Labor Agreement (leaving aside the question of whether the Mayor has administrative control over OPC), such an interpretation ought to be made only after a careful reading of the language of the Agreement itself. The fact that the District of Columbia is party to the Agreement does not by itself mean that all definitions, provisions, and requirements of a particular collective bargaining agreement are automatically transmuted or otherwise modified or redefined to fit the organizational arrangements or circumstances of agencies other than the one that employees the affected employees.

(R&R at p. 27). The Complainant contends that this finding “[i]nstead of addressing the facts presented by FOP . . . picked an obscure requirement under the CBA in an attempt to show one potential effect of applying the CBA indiscriminately to OPC. . . . The Board does not need to engage in contract interpretation to resolve this issue, as Article 13 is appropriately the only provision of the CBA that applies to OPC.” (Complainant’s Exceptions at p. 47).

The Complainant also argues that the “Report ignores facts concerning express repudiation.” (Complainant’s exception at p. 47). In support of this exception, the Complainant asserts that the evidence presented at the hearing established that “OPC expressly repudiated the CBA by explicitly and repeatedly stating to FOP Members and Shop Stewards that FOP Members are not entitled to their CBA rights during OPC investigatory interviews. Specifically, the Complainant points to incidents such as: (1) “[t]wo questioners during administrative interviews”; (2) the use of a two way mirror during interviews; (3) “questions outside the scope” of the citizen complaint; and (4) requiring the “Members [to] sign under oath paraphrased
statements by OPC investigators at the conclusion of the administrative questioning.” (Complainant’s Exceptions at pgs. 50-55).

An additional exception contends that the R&R “misconstrues the Weingarten right.” (Complainant’s Exceptions at p. 56). Specifically, the Complainant maintains that when determining whether a bargaining unit member had a reasonable belief that his/her interview might result in discipline, that no distinction should be drawn between whether a bargaining unit member is being interviewed as a potential witness to a complaint or as the target of the complaint. (See Complainant’s Exceptions at p. 56). The Complainant asserts that the Hearing Examiner finding that “witness-Members are not entitled to Weingarten rights further goes against OPC’s current policy – like that found in the CBA – that all members are allowed a union representative during all investigatory interviews.” (Complainant’s Exceptions at p. 58). The Complainant also argues that “[e]ach time an FOP member is interviewed by OPC, whether as a witness or the subject of a citizen complaint, that Member has a reasonable belief that the questioning will result in discipline. . . . thereby entitling them to Weingarten rights during all OPC interviews.” (Complainant’s Exceptions at p. 62).

The next exception contends that the R&R “failed to find that the removal of FOP Shop Stewards during Members’ investigatory interviews violated Weingarten.” (Complainant’s Exceptions at p. 62). The Complainant asserts that the Board should observe bargaining unit members’ right to representation during an investigatory interview, “but also require that the union representative be afforded the opportunity to participate in the interview.” (Complainant’s Exceptions at p. 62, citing N.L.R.B. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 730 A. 2d 166 (5th Cir. 1984). The basis for this exception centers around the Complainant’s contention that the Hearing Examiner should have found that the ejection from members’ investigatory interviews of Officers Newbold, Rosario and Cunningham violated the members’ Weingarten rights. (See Complainant’s Exceptions at pgs. 62-63).

Lastly, the Complainant contends that the Board, in the interest of justice, should award its reasonable costs incurred in opposing the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Consolidated Cases. (See Complainant’s Exceptions at p. 65). The Motion to Dismiss was referred to the Hearing Examiner, who deferred action pending the completion of the hearing on the merits of the underlying unfair labor practice complaints. (See R&R at p. 36). The Hearing Examiner did not grant the Motion to Dismiss, and further recommended that the request for costs be denied. (See R&R at pgs. 38-39). The Complainant’s exception does not find any error with the Hearing Examiner’s R&R, but does renew its request for costs based on its assertion that the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss was “without merit”, “brought in bad faith”, and “frivolous”. (Complainant’s Exceptions at pgs. 66-67).
Based on these exceptions, the Complainant requests that the Board direct an order:

(a) Finding that the collective bargaining agreement applies to OPC, and that Members are entitled to their Article 13 rights during OPC administrative interviews;

(b) Finding that OPC engaged in multiple and systematic unfair labor practices in violation of D.C. Code § 1-617.04(a)(1) and (5);

(c) Finding that FOP and OPC had mutually agreeable past practice whereby OPC agreed to comply with the terms of the CBA;

(d) Finding that OPC committed multiple and systematic unfair labor practices by violating the mutually agreeable past practice between FOP and OPC;

(e) Finding that Members subjected to OPC administrative interviews are always entitled to Weingarten rights;

(f) Finding that OPC violated Weingarten by ejecting Members’ union representatives during OPC administrative interviews;

(g) Ordering OPC to pay FOP’s costs and fees associated with opposing OPC’s Motion to Dismiss;

(h) Ordering OPC to cease and desist from interfering with, restraining or coercing the Members in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the CBA and CMPA in violation of D.C. Code § 1-617.04(a)(a) and (5);

(i) Ordering OPC to cease and desist from conducting administrative interviews with more than one questioner asking questions, which constitutes a repudiation of the CBA and thus an unfair labor practice in violation of D.C. Code § 1-617.04(a)(1) and (5);

(j) Ordering OPC to cease and desist from refusing to inform Members of the names of persons present for administrative interviews, including those present behind two-way mirrors that conceal their identity, which constitutes an unfair labor practice in violation of D.C. Code § 1-617.04(a)(1) and (5);

(k) Ordering OPC to cease and desist from demanding or requiring that Members sign under oath paraphrased statements prepared by OPC investigators at the conclusion of administrative questioning, which constitutes a
repudiation of the CBA and thus an unfair labor practice in violation of D.C. Code § 1-617.04(a)(1) and (5);

(l) Ordering OPC to cease and desist from demanding or requiring that Members to answer questions by OPC investigators that are beyond the scope of the citizen complaint being investigated in violation of D.C. Code § 1-617.04(a)(1) and (5);

(m) Compelling OPC to conspicuously post no less than two (2) notices of their violations and the Board’s Order in each OPC building and each MPD building;

(n) Compelling OPC to pay FOP’s costs and fees associated with this proceeding; and

(o) Ordering such other relief and remedies as deemed appropriate.

(Complainant’s Exceptions at pgs. 67-68).

**The Board’s Discussion of Complainant’s Exceptions**

The Complainant’s exceptions fall into two categories: (1) disputes with the Hearing Examiner’s factual findings; and (2) disputes with the Hearing Examiner’s rejection of its arguments. The Board has held that a mere disagreement with the Hearing Examiner’s findings of fact do not constitute a valid exception or support a claim of reversible error. *Hoggard v. District of Columbia Public Schools* 46 DCR 4837, Slip Op. No. 496, PERB Case 95-U-20 (1996). Therefore, the Board finds that FOP’s disagreement with the Hearing Examiner’s findings does not present a basis for reversing or modifying the Hearing Examiner’s Report and Recommendation. As a result, the Boards adopt the Hearing Examiner’s findings that: “(1) Complainant has not shown that Respondent repudiated a collective bargaining agreement”; and “(2) Complainant has not shown that Respondent violated any employee’s Weingarten rights.” (R&R at p. 39).

The Board has held that a Hearing Examiner has the authority to determine the probative value of evidence and to draw reasonable inferences from that evidence. *Hoggard v. District of Columbia Public Schools* 46 DCR 4837, Slip Op. No. 496, PERB Case 95-U-20 (1996). The Board has also held that a mere disagreement with a Hearing Examiner’s factual findings based on competing evidence is not a valid exception where the record evidence also supports the Hearing Examiner’s finding. *Id.* In the present case, the Hearing Examiner heard testimony on the issue of whether OPC’s actions were inconsistent with the CBA and the CMPA. FOP disagrees with the Hearing Examiner’s finding on this issue and asserts that OPC was bound by both to allow Union representation of its members. Based on the Board’s holding in *Hoggard v.*
DCPS, the Board finds that FOP's disagreement with the Hearing Examiner's findings does not constitute a valid exception, nor does it support a claim of reversible error. *Id.*

In addition, the Board has held that it will adopt a Hearing Examiner's recommendation if it finds that, upon review of the record, the Hearing Examiner's analysis, reasoning and conclusions are rational, reasonable, persuasive and supported by the record. See *D.C. Nurses Association and D.C. Department of Human Services*, 32 DCR 3355, Slip Op. No. 112, PERB Case No. 84-U-08 (1985) and *D.C. Nurses Association and D.C. Health and Hospitals Public Benefit Corporation*, 46 DCR 6271, Slip Op. No. 583, PERB Case No. 98-U-02 (1999). The Board believes that the arguments presented in its exceptions were the same arguments considered and rejected by the Hearing Examiner. Whereas the Board finds the Hearings Examiner's findings and conclusions to be rational, supported by the record and consistent with Board precedent, the Complainant's exceptions are denied and the Board adopts the Hearing Examiner's recommendation that: (1) the unfair labor practice complaints be dismissed in their entirety, with prejudice; and (2) the Complainant's motion for an award of costs be denied.

**VIII. Respondent's Exceptions.**

The Respondent's exceptions to the Hearing Examiner's Report and Recommendation consist of disputes with arguments made before the Hearing Examiner at the hearing and in its post hearing brief.

In its exceptions, Respondent asserts that the Hearing Examiner “avoiding addressing [arguments] regarding PERB's lack of jurisdiction, as well as avoiding any discussion of PERB precedent related to jurisdiction. Instead, the [Hearing Examiner] interpreted select provisions of the CMPA to conclude that the parties to the collective bargaining agreement at issue were District of Columbia and the Fraternal Order of Police.” (Respondent's Exceptions at p. 4, citing R&R at p. 30). Further, the Respondent argues that the Hearing Examiner “bypassed the argument that Weingarten rights were not included in the CMPA by stating that the HE, was bound by PERB precedent holding that the *Weingarten* right exists.” (Respondent’s Exceptions at p. 4). Thus, the Respondent argues that the Hearing Examiner’s “analysis, reasoning and conclusions contained in the [R&R] are not rational, persuasive, or supported by the record.” (Respondent’s Exceptions at p. 4).

In support of its position, Respondent argues that “the Hearing Examiner misconstrued various provisions of the CMPA to conclude that the parties to a collective bargaining agreement are the certified bargaining unit representative and the Mayor.” (Respondent’s Exceptions at p. 5). The Respondent asserts that the Hearing Examiner failed to resolve and conclude in his

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10 The Respondent specifically points to the Hearing Examiner's analysis in his R&R where he states:
analysis of the relevant provisions of the CMPA the established “dichotomy between the Mayor and the “parties”, [which] supports OPC’s argument that it is not a party to the agreement and, therefore, OPC should not be considered bound by the agreement.” (Respondent’s Exceptions at p. 10). In addition, the Respondent requests that the Board “provide an analysis that does what the HE failed to do, which was to review all relevant provisions [of the CMPA] and address any discrepancies or ambiguities contained in the various provisions contained within the CMPA.”

The Respondent’s final exception is to the Hearing Examiner’s ruling that rejected its argument that no Weingarten right exists in the CMPA and the Hearing Examiner’s finding that “PERB precedent clearly holds that the Weingarten right exists. PERB is free to modify or reverse its prior decisions; as Hearing Examiner, I am bound by those decisions.” (See Respondent’s Exceptions at p. 14; and R&R at p. 30). The Respondent contends that the Board Rules, as well as the CMPA, allow the Hearing Examiner to reverse and/or modify Board precedent. (See Respondent’s Exceptions at pgs. 14-16). Moreover, the Respondent argues that the Hearing Examiner should have accepted its argument, and reversed Board precedent finding that a Weingarten right exists in the CMPA. (See Respondent’s Exceptions at pgs 16-17).

The Board’s Discussion of Respondent’s Exceptions

The Board believes that the arguments raised in the Respondent’s exceptions are the same arguments considered and rejected by the Hearing Examiner. The Board finds that the Hearing Examiner’s analysis to be reasonable, rational, persuasive and supported by the record. Therefore, the Board adopts the Hearing Examiner's conclusions and denies Respondent’s exceptions.

In addition, the Board rejects the Respondent’s request to reverse the Board’s previous decisions that have found that a Weingarten right exists in the CMPA.11 In NLRB v. Weingarten,

In my view, the logic of the above-described statutory structure is that the parties to collective bargaining agreements are those to whom the statute clearly assigns the responsibility for engaging in collective bargaining: the Mayor (or other personnel authority) and the exclusive representative of the bargaining unit. Each of these personnel authorities is clearly acting on behalf of the District, within the scope of the authority delegated to it by the CMPA. For the purposes of the cases at issue in this proceeding, the parties to the Labor Agreement are the District of Columbia and the Fraternal Order of Police/Metropolitan Police Department Labor Committee.

(R&R at p. 25)

11 The Board notes that Respondent believes the Board should issue a decision which makes specific rulings about the fact that Weingarten is based on specific language used in the NLRA that does not exist in the CMPA. For the reasons set forth below, the Board finds that the CMPA contains language, although not identical to that used in the NLRA, which provides for the rights explained in the Weingarten decision.
the United States Supreme Court upheld the NLRB’s determination that an employee has a right to union representation during an investigatory interview that the employee reasonably fears might result in discipline. The NLRB had held that an employer “interfered with, restrained and coerced the individual right of an employee ‘to engage in . . . concerted activities for . . . mutual aid and protection . . . ’ in situations where the employee requests representation . . . as a condition of participation in an interview . . . where the employee reasonably believes the investigation will result in disciplinary action.” Id at p. 257.¹²

Like the NLRA, the CMPA at D.C. Code § 1-617.04(a)(1), also prohibits the District, its agents and representatives from interfering with, restraining or coercing any employee in the exercise of their rights. The Board has recognized a right to union representation during a disciplinary interview in accordance with the standards set forth in Weingarten. In D.C. Nurses, supra, the Board recognized the right to union representation during a disciplinary interview. In that case, the hearing examiner had found that the agency violated the Weingarten rights of two bargaining unit employees when the agency threatened to discipline one of the employees when she requested union representation by the other union officer. Id. In the present case, the Hearing Examiner’s finding that a Weingarten right exists in the CMPA is consistent with this analysis. Therefore, the Board finds that the Hearing Examiner’s decision not to overrule the Board’s precedent regarding the Weingarten right is clearly reasonable. Moreover, the Board finds the Hearing Examiner’s conclusion in this matter to be consistent with Board precedent and adopts the Hearing Examiner’s recommendation that Weingarten rights exist for union members subjected to investigatory interviews by OPC and who have a reasonable belief that the interview may result in disciplinary action.

Conclusion

Pursuant to D.C. Code § 1-605.02 (3) (2001) and Board Rule 520.14, the Board has reviewed the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Hearing Examiner. Whereas, the Board finds the Hearing Examiner’s findings, conclusions and recommendations to be reasonable, persuasive and supported by the record, the Board adopts the Hearing Examiner’s recommendations to the Board.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Fraternal Order of Police/Metropolitan Police Department Labor Committee’s ("FOP", "Union" or "Complainant") unfair labor practice complaint ("Complaint") is dismissed.

2. Pursuant to Board Rule 559.1, this Decision and Order is final upon issuance.

BY ORDER OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS BOARD
Washington, D.C.

September 30, 2009
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that the attached Decision and Order in PERB Case Nos. 06-U-24, 06-U-25, 06-U-26 and 06-U-28 was transmitted via Fax and U.S. Mail to the following parties on this the 30th day of September 2009.

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